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Abstract: This research aims to measure maslahah level on collateral implementation in mudaraba 
financing contract at sharia banking. This is important, because although the existence of collateral in 
the contract is able to create such maslahah, but there is no specific level regarding to it. Then, this 
research also tries to examine the relationship between collateral to maslahah itself in order to know 
the effect which give by those variables. This is an explanatory research uses a quantitative approach 
with survey method. This research also uses descriptive statistic and path analysis method by IBM 
SPSS Statistic 22 in order to reach the purpose of this research. This research picked sharia banking 
practitioners and customers specifically in Cirebon as the population, reaching 116 respondent which 
used as the sample of research. The result of this research reported that the implementation of collateral 
in mudaraba financing contract is truly provide maslahah level both for sharia banking practitioners 
and customers. This result was also strengthened by the direct effect between each variable which 
revealed a positive significant effect. 
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Introduction 
Maqāshid al-syariah is an indicator for measuring every muamalah activity, determining whether it is 
appropriate through sharia principle or not. This is because when muamalah activities appropriate with 
maqāshid syariah, absolutely it contains a justice (Zahrah, 1997; Syaputra et al., 2014). Therefore, it is 
important for every sharia bank to ensure that every operational activity is appropriate through sharia 
principle. 
 Furthermore, the number of collateral which provides by customers when receiving muḍāraba 
financing contract is various, depending on the amount of financing proposed by the customers 
(Harahap, 2008; Junaedi & Nufus, 2019). Although the existence of collateral in muḍāraba contract is 
in accordance with maqāṣid shariah concept, specifically hifdz al-māl (Harahap, 2008, 2020; Lestari, 
2019), it does not clearly enough regarding to the rate of maslahah itself.  Thus, it is important to 
measure the rate of maslahah on collateral implementation of muḍāraba contract in order to know does 
collateral implementation truly provide maslahah.  
Theoretically, muḍāraba is a contract between sharia bank (ṣāhib al-māl) and customer (muḍārib) 
conducting such business partnership based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) system, and there is no 
collateral requirement in the contact (Al-Zuhaily, 2013). Practically at sharia banking, it does not 
accordance through the general theory that the bank requires such collateral aspect to customer 
(muḍārib). The reason why sharia bank requires collateral to customer (muḍārib), because muḍāraba 
contract contains such high risk due to moral hazard and asymmetry information which might be done 
by customer (muḍārib), thus the function of collateral in this condition is to be a preventive tool, and 
this is in line through maqāṣid syariah concept, specifically hifdz al-māl (Harahap, 2020; Lestari, 2019; 
Muhammad, 2019). Realized that muḍāraba financing contract contains a high risk, it makes sharia 
banking more interest to offers other financing products such as murābaha, salām, istishna and another 
product rather than muḍāraba contract, and many others basic problem of muḍāraba financing contract 
(Saeed, 1996).This happens because as the core product of sharia banking, muḍāraba does not popular 
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enough as another financing product such as murābaha, salām, and istisna. Moreover, Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan Indonesia (2019) reports that the number of muḍāraba is always lower than another financing 
product. 
Muḍāraba financing contract was always getting a small number for over the years. According to 
Muhammad (2019), this condition happened due to such an asymmetry of mechanism and moral hazard 
activity in muḍāraba contract. Muhammad (2019) also delineates that there are two factors which are 
influencing such an asymmetry between theory and reality in order to operate the mechanism of profit 
and loss sharing system products. Firstly is an internal factor, in this part sharia banking seems like does 
not understand well how muḍāraba concept work. Secondly is external factor, society’s integrity 
become a main point which means the society as known as customer or agent (muḍārib) of sharia 
banking must have high an integrity and trusteeship level in order to carry out muḍāraba financing 
contract because this contract based on profit and loss sharing system (Muhammad, 2019). This is also 
in accordance with previous researches that PLS products are susceptible to moral hazard and 
asymmetry information (Hafidah, 2012; Harahap, 2020; Jamilah, 2012).   
Linking to the information, the author picks Cirebon, one of city in West Java as a sample of sharia 
banking in Indonesia which is offering muḍāraba financing activity with collateral implementation. 
This is because the development of sharia banking in Indonesia already spread evenly. Besides, 
although Cirebon is categorized as a small city, there is rapid growth of sharia banking institution in 
Cirebon, and this is evidence by almost all state owned enterprice (BUMN) sharia banks are available 
there such as BNI Syariah, BRI Syariah, Mandiri Syariah. Not only that, there also several number of 
private, and international sharia banking which established there such as Muamalat, Mega Syariah, 
Danamon Syariah, Sinarmas Syariah, BCA Syariah, Niaga Syariah, OCBC NISP Syariah, BTPN 
Syariah, and so ford. Moreover, Cirebon has the highest number of sharia commercial bank offices 
distribution compared to Indramayu, Majalengka, and Kuningan (CIAYUMAJAKUNING). 
Refers to the background that had explained, this research would like to measure the rate of 
maslahah on collateral implementation of muḍāraba contract. Thus, this research aims to provide the 
measurement of maslahah on collateral implementation of muḍāraba contract. 
Literature Review 
The Concept of Muḍāraba Financing Contract at Sharia Banking 
The principle of profit sharing is a common characteristic and the basic basis for sharia bank's operations 
as a whole. Based on this principle, sharia banks will serve as an intermediation institution for investors 
and customers. Nevertheless, in it’s development, the users of sharia banks do not limit to just 
muḍārabah contract, but in accordance with the type of business nature. Thus, some get funds with a 
sharing system, trading system and renting (Antonio, 2001; Lestari, 2019). 
According to Dahlan, muḍārabah is a transactional system which developed since pre-Islam which 
was later identified and became a value system in fiqh. In the context of fiqh muamalah, it is explained 
that muḍārabah is a form business partnership between muḍārib and ṣāhib al-māl, where the ṣāhib al-
māl gives such capital to muḍārib for managing it properly. If there is profit from the business, it is 
jointly owned and divided in accordance with the agreement, and in the event of any loss it is borne 
entirely by the ṣahib al-māl (Dahlan, 2012). Basically, muḍārabah offers a comprehensive view, which 
means that all economic activities in Islam are aimed to meet economic needs and ruhaniyyah 
simultaneously, put forward values, ethics, morals, and justice for the creation of maslahah in 
accordance with Islamic economic objectives (Hulam, 1998). 
Capital investment at sharia banks based on a profit sharing system includes a muārabah agreement 
and musyārakah. The characteristics of muḍārabah financing are the presence of two parties namely 
ṣāhib al-māl and muḍārib. Furthermore, refers to the function in muḍārabah contract there is a "two-
tier" muḍārabah. This is because sharia bank is an intermediation institution as the basis for collecting 
such funds from the community and will then be funneled to the communities as well in various forms 
of financing and capital investment (Hadi, 2015; Lestari, 2019). Thus, at sharia banking is known by 
the existence of two sides of banking. On the side of community fundraising, sharia bank serves as the 
capital manager (muḍārib) in managing investor funds as ṣāhib al-māl through muḍārabah contracts 
such as deposits. While on the side of financing, sharia bank acts as ṣāhib al-māl in order to funnel the 
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capital through muḍārabah and musyārakah contracts, meanwhile the customers are known as muḍārib 
(Lestari, 2019). 
Muḍārabah contract which done between sharia banks and investors are relatively safe, due to the 
presence of close supervision from central bank to the banking sector that require the latter to follow 
government regulation which is central bank in order to protect customers' funds. On the other hand, 
when sharia banks act as ṣāhib al-māl, the bank has a high risk of financial problems. This is happening 
because it does not yet have standards of regulation that organize such costs for various types of 
businesses. In addition, it does not have yet such institutions that supervise customer as muḍārib (Hadi, 
2015). 
Thus, compared to other sharia bank financing products such as murābahah, istisnā', ijārah, salām, 
and others, the capital investment with muḍārabah contract is considered as the business financing 
contract that has the highest risk. This is because, in this agreement the bank provides such capital for 
business which handed over entirely to muḍārib. Thus, when muḍārib gain such profit from the business 
partnership, it will be distributed in accordance through the agreed ratio, and in the event of loss, it will 
be borne fully by the bank (Destiana, 2016; Hadi, 2015; Lestari, 2019; Permata, 2014). This is because, 
muḍārabah financing contract is basically use trust as the basic principle of it, but practically, sharia 
banks requires such collateral to customers to guarantee as evidence that the customer will do such 
moral hazard or asymmetry information that trigger financial loss (Harahap, 2008, 2020). 
According to Maulana (2014), the function of collateral on muḍārabah financing is a prudential tool 
that used by sharia banks to minimize financial risk. Where in the event of default or something 
undesirable, sharia banks can overcome it by disbursing collateral. Besides therefore, it is also used to 
as one of the tools to create customers (muḍārib) become more serious in cooperating when they are 
doing muḍārabah contract (Maulana, 2014). The reason why sharia banks require such collateral in 
muḍārabah financing is to realize the principle of prudence in preventing all possible risks that may 
occur and can cause losses both in the short and long term (Lestari, 2019). 
The main risk of muḍārabah financing product is credit risk that occurs if the customer (muḍib) 
performs default. The high risk becomes consideration of why sharia banks are less interested in 
providing muḍārabah financing, because of the difficulty to find the honest and trustworthy customers 
in performing their duties and obligations. To solve this matter, sharia banks analyze the feasibility of 
financing in advance to find the prospective customers (Harahap, 2008; Maulana, 2014; Muhammad, 
2019). 
The Concept of Collateral 
Generally, collateral is guaranteed form in the term of assets or properties which are provided by 
customers of financing in order to guarantee such repayment of receivables between borrowers and 
lenders (Hafidah, 2017). The definition of collateral according to Black’s Law Dictionary is “a 
conveyance of title to property that is given as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of 
a duty and that will become void upon payment or performance according to stipulated terms” (Black’s 
Law Dictionary, 2019). 
Another definition of collateral is to ensure the fullness of obligations that can be assessed with 
money, arising from a legal alliance. In addition, collateral is also something which is given to the 
creditor that the debtor will meet the obligations. Besides, collateral is also one of the legal ways to 
secure such repayments of financing that had been provided (Hafidah, 2017; Setiono, 2018).  
Furthermore, guarantee is closely related to the rights of the property. Guarantee is an object of right 
and part of the law of the object as stipulated in book II Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) (Subekti, 2014).  
In Arabic, the term of collateral is known as al-rahn, which has a sense of restraint, which means 
obligate people to pay off the obligation, thus not to become restrained anymore (Hafidah, 2012, 2017). 
This term is also similar in fiqh term which defines collateral as al-rahn, this term classified as tabarru’ 
contract (Al-Ghazali, 2008). According to Sayyid As-sabiq, al-rahn is an item which has economic 
value in the view of syara' to be used as a collateral of debt, which allows to pay off all or part of such 
debt (Sabiq, 1993). Meanwhile, in the term of Islamic jurisprudence, al-rahn means such an ownership 
in term of wealth which offers as the security of such debt or financing, thus when the customer is failed 
to pay back the amount of money which received from the financing or debt contract, the wealth would 
be taken to settle it.  
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Antonio delineates that the definition of al-rahn is to withhold one of the customer's property (rahin) 
as collateral (marhun) for such debt, loan financing (marhun bih) that had been received, where the 
collateral is required to have economic value. Thus the withholder (murtahin) obtains such collateral to 
take back all or part of its receivable (Antonio, 2001). Therefore, based on several definitions of al-
rahn in the term of collateral, it can be concluded that al-rahn is an item or object that has economic 
value and benefits, which is used as collateral in debt or financing contracts. 
Furthermore, there are several other muamalah concept which defines collateral such as ta’widh and 
taḍommun (Syahroni & Karim, 2016). Ta’widh is derived from the word 'iwadha which means to 
change or replace. In general, the definition of ta'widh is to cover such losses that occur due to violations 
or errors with the provision of real losses that can be clearly taken into account by efforts to obtain such 
payments (Yunus, 1989). Meanwhile, according to fatwa of National Sharia Council, ta’widh should 
only be imposed on parties who intentionally do something that deviates from the provisions of the 
contract and causes losses on for other party, while where the loss which addressed by ta'widh is the 
real losses and can be taken into account. The amount of ta'widh is in accordance with the value of real 
loss in the term of fixed cost in such a transaction, and it is not categorized as expected, or potential 
losses due to the lack of opportunity (Dewan Syariah Nasional MUI, 2004). 
Another muamalah term which represent collateral is taḍomun or ḍaman (Hulam, 1998; Syahroni 
& Karim, 2016). Etymologically, ḍaman has quite diverse meanings such as bear, responsibility, and 
obligation. In the Lisan al-'Arab Dictionary which quoted by Asmuni Muth, Ibn Manzut pointed out 
that all meanings of ḍaman are connected to the collateral, insurer or warranty. Another meaning which 
quite close is also found in al-Muhith dictionary which defines ḍaman as compensation (Muth, 2007). 
In fiqh terms, ḍaman is also has several meanings. Imam Ghazali for example, interprets ḍaman with a 
necessity to compensate an item with the same goods or equal to its selling value. In addition, al-Hamaw 
said that ḍaman is a replace damaged items with the same or equivalent items which have equal 
economist value. As-Syaukani also said that ḍaman is an item for replacing damaged goods (Muth, 
2007). 
Based on the several explanations, it can be concluded that there are several terms both linguistic 
and fiqh which are represent collateral in such muamalah activity, specifically transaction, where from 
all the explanations explain that collateral has a function to cover such losses that occur due to violations 
or errors with the provision of real losses that can be clearly taken into account by efforts to obtain such 
payments. 
Generally, collateral is classified into 3 terms which are collateral of moving object, collateral of 
unmoving object, and collateral for non-material object. Those three terms of collateral have important 
meaning to understand the types and function of it (Susilo, 2017): 
1. Collateral of Moving Object 
In this term it is classified such items or properties as an object of collateral that can be moved 
such as vehicles and banks’ deposits. Those objects are classified into moving objects due to their 
sense nature which are moveable and transferable. 
2. Collateral of Unmoving Object 
In this condition, the object which can be used as collateral is an unmoving object physically. 
The types of this object are land and building. This kind of object is receivable as collateral due 
to its economics value. 
3. Collateral of Non-Material Object 
This type of collateral is different from the two advances collateral’s type. This is because 
collateral which is accepted in this condition is not in the term of properties, but non-material 
objects such as assurance, character of people, etc.  
The understanding of the collateral that has been described generally, describes that collateral is an 
obligation that can be assessed with money, in the form of certain objects which are submitted by 
financing customers to the sharia bank for the financing facility that has been provided. Collateral 
understanding indicates that it is given to protect such interests of the bank in order to secure the funds 
that have been funneled to customers through the contract. This is because collateral provides such legal 
certainty for bank that the customer will pay back the funds had received in accordance with the 
applicable contract (Rustam, 2016), thus based on the explanation it could be seen the function of 
collateral as follows: 
Global Review of Islamic Economics and Business, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2021) 079-096 83 
 
1. Give the right and power to the bank to get such repayment from the sale of such collateral if the 
customer defaults by not paying off his obligations at the specified time. 
2. Ensuring that customers participate in transactions to finance their business, thus preventing the 
possibility of leaving their business or project at the detriment of themselves or their company. 
3. Encourages customers to fulfill their obligations in financing contracts. 
The Concept of Maslahah 
Linguistically, maslahah means good which means the loss of damage (Manzūr, 1994). While in 
Mukhtār al-Sihah it is defined that maslahah is the opposite of damage (al-Rāzî, 1967). Thus, it is 
generally understood that maslahah in terms of language is something that brings good to mankind. 
Such goodness associated with mankind is considered maslahah even though it is literally does not 
bring any good to mankind. 
Understanding maslahah according to the term can be seen from the opinion of scholars when 
discussing about maslahah and munāsib. However, the scholars still do not agree with the definition of 
maslahah and its limitations also such different acceptance. Based on that, there are several definition 
of maslahah as follows. Al-Ghazali defines that maslahah is a maintenance of syara’ purposes which 
means that maslahah is such a thing to reach welfare and avoid any damage. However, the meaning of 
achieve benefits and reject such damage by al-Ghazali here is not to achieve the will and purpose of 
mankind. But, the purpose of achieving benefits and to achieve the purpose of syara' which includes 
religion, soul, intellect, descent, and wealth (al-Ghazali, 2008). According to al-Syatibî, maslahah is all 
that is understood to elaborate the maslahah of mankind with achievement of maslahah itself and 
rejection of mafsadah, and it is not acquired by reason but it must be i'tiraf by syara' to receive or reject 
it (Al-Syatibi, 2003). 
Therefore, from the scholars definitions defined regarding to maslahah, it can be concluded that 
maslahah according to the term is all things that protect the will and the purpose of syara' by preserving 
religion, soul, intellect, descendants and property. 
Linking to the information, maqāṣid al-syariah to be such an indicator of maslahah in muamalah 
activity. This is because, the sense of maqāṣid al-syariah can be known by referring to al-Syatibi's 
explanation through his work al-muwāfaqat fii uṣul al-syari'ah. He explained that sharia was 
determined for reaching such benefit of humankind for hereafter regarding to maintaining the rules that 
will convey it to the levels of perfection, kindness, culture, and civilization (Al-Syatibi, 2003). Refers 
to the explanation, it could be seen that maslahah in general can be achieved in two ways: 
1. To realize such welfare, goodness and pleasure for humankind, and those are called jalb al-
mānafi'. This kindness can be felt directly at the moment or indirectly in the future. 
2. Avoiding and preventing such damage which is often termed as dar' al-māfasid. 
Meanwhile another opinion also coming from Abu Zahrah. He explained that such eternality of 
welfare refers to the five main pillars of maqāṣid al-syariah which are hifdz al-dīn, hifdz al-‘aql, hifdz 
al-nās, hifdz al-‘irḍ, and hifdz al-māl. But, he also tries to classify the al-syariah itself, into three main 
pillars as bellows (Zahrah, 1997):  
1. Tahzib al-Farḍ  
Educating individuals to be a source of blesseing for such groups and communities around them, 
by not being a source of damage for them. Where such a thing can be pursued by establishing 
such worship. 
2. Iqāmah al-‘Adl  
Uphold justice in Islamic societies, both internally and externally between them and other people. 
This is prominent because in Islam, justice is the highest goal. 
3. Jalb al-Maslahah   
Creating welfare in all aspects of law. This is because all the rulings that have been prescribed 
by the Qur'an and Sunnah must contain the content of essential benefit. 
Further, from the general concept of maqāṣid al-syariah which revealed by Abu Zahrah, Mohammed 
and Razak (2008) developed the concept of maqāṣid al-syariah itself in order to create such public 
interest, and avoid any damages, where maqaāṣid al-syariah covers three important aspects, these are 
84 Lestari & Qoyum: Measuring Maslahah on Collateral Implementation in Mudaraba Contract At Sharia Banking 
 
educating individuals, establishing justice and public interest (Mohammed & Razak, 2008). Thus, based 
on the development Maqāṣhid Sharia Index (MSI) method was formed, described by Mustafa Omar 
Muhammed and Dzuljastri Abdul Razak (2008) in their research titled The Performance Measures of 
Islamic Banking Based on the Maqashid Framework, and formulated as the performance evaluation of 
Sharia banking, referring the concept of maqāṣid al-syariah. Furthermore, Mohammed and Razak 
(2008) divided MSI into three main objectives which are tahzib al-farḍ (educating), iqāmah al-‘adl 
(upholding justice), and jalb al-maslahah (public interest). These three objectives are established as the 
dimensions which are classified into several elements (Mohammed & Razak, 2008), and formulated as 
below: 
MI = P1 (O1) + P2 (O2) + P3 (O3)        (1) 
Description: 
MI  = Maqāṣhid index 
P1 (O1) = Performance index objective 1 (tahzib al-farḍ) 
P2 (O2) = Performance index objective 2 (iqāmah al-‘adl) 
P3 (O3) = Performance index objective 3 (jalb al-maslahah) 
Collateral Implementation in Muḍāraba Financing Contract at Sharia Banking Perspective Maqāṣid 
Al-Syari’ah 
The existence of collateral in muḍāraba financing is one of the implementations of prudential banking 
principle specifically 5C principles of financing analysis. This principle is prominent due to the primary 
function of sharia banks as intermediary institutions which have to collect the amount of funds from 
society and funnel it back to the society through financing products. Specific for muḍāraba financing 
contract, there is a special term, calls “two-tier” muḍāraba, which makes sharia bank has two function 
as ṣāhib al-māl (capital owner) and also as muḍārib at the same time (Dahlan, 2012; Lestari, 2019). 
As muḍārib, sharia bank has an obligation to manage, operate and secure the investors’ (third party) 
fund in order to support it operational activity through financing from. Thus, when sharia banks provide 
the amount of capital to the prospective financing customers, it is used the third party’s capital that is 
entrusted to the bank. Based on this condition, it triggers sharia banks to prevent any damage regarding 
to keeping off the investors fund. This is because sharia banks must always be ready when the investor 
would like to withdraw their amount of capital. Furthermore, sharia bank also not interesting enough to 
provide muḍāraba financing contract, due to the high risk of financial. Thus, collateral is a must and 
important in this kind of contract to avoid such financial losses (Lestari, 2019). 
Another consideration is that muḍāraba financing contract has a high financial risk due to moral 
hazard and asymmetry information compared to other financing contract such as murābaha, ijara, 
salām, istishnā’, etc. Thus, based on the reason, most sharia banks in Indonesia are tend to provide those 
other financing products except muḍāraba (Lestari, 2019; Muhammad, 2019). Collateral in muḍāraba 
financing contract only able to be disbursed if customers (muḍārib) have violated the contract of the 
agreement. This is because, the purpose of collateral is only as a binding which tights and triggers 
muḍārib to be good faith in carrying out the business partnership that in accordance trough sharia 
principle (Harahap, 2008; 2020; Jamilah, 2012; Maulana, 2014). Furthermore, the number of collateral 
that offered by customer to the sharia bank is adjusted to the amount of financing which proposed by 
the customer (Hadi, 2015; Lestari, 2019). 
Based on the explanation, it concludes that collateral in the view of maqāsid al-syariah is a 
preventive tool of banks in safeguarding such property. In this case it is a third party's fund (investor). 
Furthermore, collateral in muḍāraba financing also prevent such thing that cause such losses both for 
sharia bank or financing customers, where the estuary of prudential principles is one of parts to establish 
such welfare for people. This is in accordance with the principle of the sharia, specifically hifz al-māl 
as mentioned in the Qur'an surah an-Nisā: 5 (Lestari, 2019). 
لَُكْم قِيَاًما َواْرُزقُوُهْم فِيَها َواْكُسوُهْم َوقُولُوا  ُ لَُهْم قَْوًَل  َوََل تُْؤتُوا السُّفََهاَء أَْمَوالَُكُم الَّتِي َجعََل َّللاَّ
 َمْعُروفً 
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Meaning: “To those weak of understanding make not over your property, which Allah made a means 
of support of you, but feed and clothe them therewith, and speak to them words of kindness and justice 
(Q.S An-Nisa: 5). 
Data and Methodology 
Data and Samples 
The purpose of this research is to measure the level of maslahah on collateral implementation in 
muḍāraba financing contract at sharia banking, as well as the effect of it toward satisfaction. The study 
was conducted in Cirebon one of regions in Indonesia, which has a rapid growth of sharia banking. This 
research also uses a quantitative approach with a survey method. Survey is a research method that uses 
questionnaires as a data collection tool, with approximately 166 samples, containing 49 practitioners of 
sharia banking practitioners and 67 customers of sharia bank. 
Empirical Model 
This research is an explanatory research regarding to measuring maslahah of collateral implementation 
in muḍāraba financing contract at sharia banking. This model of research tries to connect among 
variables which have developed by previous researches and theories that have existed. Explanatory 
research is a study that examines each variable deeply in order to obtain results on whether or not such 
symptoms relate to the relationship of variables (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016).  
Further, this research uses descriptif statistic test and path analysis model to analyse more deeply 
regarding to the issue. This descriptive statistic test used in this research to examine the level of 
maslahah and customer satisfaction levels simultaneously as the impact of collateral implementation in 
muḍārabah financing contract. While for path analysis method, it used to measure and know the 
correlation between collateral to satisfaction through maslahah as the intervening variable, and Figure 




Figure 1. Empirical Model 
 
Path analysis Model I: 
Y1 = β0 + X + ε 
Path analysis Model II: 
Y2 = β0 + β1 X + β2 Y1 + ε 
Description: 
X : Collateral 
Y1 : Maslahah 
Y2 : Customer satisfaction 
β : Coefficient of each variables 
ε : Other factors, indicating can affect dependent variables 
Empirical Result and Discussion 
Measuring Maslahah Level on Collateral Implementation in Muḍāraba Financing Contract at 
Sharia Banking 
Based on the results of questionnaires to sharia banking customers and practitioners regarding to the 
rate of maslahah level as the impact of collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract, such 
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Table 1. Total Average Level of Maslahah 
Table 1 shows that the total average which gained regarding to measuring maslahah variable as the 
impact of collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking based on 
customers’ and practitioners’ perceptions is 6.0, and the average is reached 4.8 which categorizing at 
very maslahah level refers to the indicator shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Classification Level of Maslahah and Customer Satisfaction 
Score Description 
1.00 – 1.99 Un-maslahah/un-satisfy 
2.00 – 2.99 Slightly maslahah/slightly satisfy 
3.00 – 3.99 Maslahah/satisfy 
4.00 – 4.99 Very maslahah/very satisfy 
5.00 – 6.00 Maximum maslahah/maximum satisfaction 
Source: Junaedi (2018). 
However, although the general level of maslahah regarding to collateral implementation in 
muḍārabah financing contract reached at very maslahah level, it has such different perceptions between 
customers and practitioners as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics Output for Maslahah based on Practitioners’ Perception 
Descriptive Statistics N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Maslahah (practitioners) 49 2.00 4.00 6.00 5.1047 
Valid N (listwise) 49         
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics Output for Maslahah based on Customers’ Perception 
Descriptive Statistics N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Maslahah (customers) 67 4.27 1.33 5.60 4.5846 
Valid N (listwise) 67         
Table 3 and Tabel 4 delineates that there is different level of maslahah between practitioners and 
customers. Maximum value of maslahah level which gained by the former is 6.0, with average score at 
5.1 which categorizing at very maslahah level. While for the latter, the number of maximum value of 
maslahah level, reaching at 5.6, with average value at 4.5 which is at very maslahah level. Therefore, 
based on the result, the implementation of collateral in muḍārabah financing contract reached maslahah 
level both for the practitioners and customers. 
Based on the result, it is clearly described that the implementation of collateral in muḍārabah 
financing contract at sharia banking statistically gives specific maslahah level both for practitioners and 
customers. Nevertheless, it has such different level of maslahah between the former and the latter, but 
still reached maslahah itself. This is inline through the theory of maslahah itself which reflected by 
maqāṣid al-syariah specifically hifdz al-māl which command to protect and keep such properties or 
wealth in every muamalah activity (Auda, 2019). 
Maslahah level based on practitioners’ perception reached 5.1 which is maximum maslahah (refers 
to Table 4), and it is higher than maslahah level for customers, reaching 4.5. This is happened due to 
Two-tier concept in muḍārabah financing contract, which makes sharia banking has two functions when 
dealing such contract with customers (Dahlan, 2014). On one hand, sharia banking becomes muḍārib 
(capital manager) when customers (ṣāhib al-māl) invested or entrusted their amount of money to the 
bank to manage properly. In this condition, it can be ensured that the contract is particularly safe due to 
such regulation which burdens the bank to manage the third party’s capital, as well as keeping their 
belief (Lestari, 2019). 
Descriptive Statistics N Range Minimum Maximum Mean 
Maslahah 116 4.67 1.33 6.00 4.8043 
Valid N (listwise) 116         
Global Review of Islamic Economics and Business, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2021) 079-096 87 
 
On the other hand, when sharia banking to be a capital owner (ṣāhib al-māl) which provided such 
financing to customers (muḍārib), the contract becomes susceptible. This is because, the amount of 
fund which provided by sharia banking to the customers basically use the investors’ capital, and 
generally, in muḍārabah financing contract there is no collateral requirement in to it, only trust between 
the former and the latter while dealing contract. Based on it, due to sharia banking has an obligation to 
keep the investors wealth, the bank requires such collateral as a guarantee form to make sure that 
customer serious and will to pay off their obligation to the bank (Dahlan, 2014; Muhammad, 2019). 
Besides, the requirements of collateral in muḍārabah financing contract also as the representation of 
Collateral Fiduciary Law No. 42, 1999, KUHP act 499 which revealed that every credit or financing 
must be proposed such collateral as the guarantee tool. 
Thus, based on the explanation, the implementation of collateral in muḍārabah financing contract 
based on sharia banking practitioners is for keeping and maintaining the third parties’ capital which has 
entrusted to the bank, and this is in line with the previous research which delineated that collateral 
implementation in the contract is appropriate with maqāṣid al-syariah specifically hifdz al-māl which 
command to protect and keep such properties or wealth in every muamalah activity (Harahap, 2008; 
Jamilah, 2012; Lestari, 2019; Maulana, 2014). 
Furthermore, maslahah level which gained based on customer’s perception is slightly lower than 
maslahah level based on sharia banking practitioners’ perception. Meanwhile, maslahah level of 
customer still reached at 5.60. This is happened because sharia banking customers believe that every 
muamalah activity which is operated by sharia banking is operated based on sharia principle. That is 
why, when sharia banking requires such collateral to customers, the customer willing to give it. Besides, 
they also realize that collateral requirement is one of regulations that must be fulfilled when they are 
proposed muḍārabah financing contract, as well as a sign of seriousness that they will pay off their 
obligation to sharia banking based on the agreement. This is in accordance with the previous research 
which reported that collateral becomes a sign of customers’ seriousness that they deserve to receive the 
financing contract, because they are able to repay it (Harahap, 2008). 
It is evidence, the main differences between this research, and previous researches is that the latter 
have not measure yet such maslahah level regarding to collateral implementation in muḍārabah 
financing contract. Therefore, this research tries to provide such maslahah measurement regarding to 
it. 
Measuring Satisfaction Level on Collateral Implementation in Muḍāraba Financing Contract at 
Sharia Banking 
Based on the result of the questionnaire, Tabel 5, Table 6, and Table 7 show the satisfaction level 
regarding to colateral implementation in muḍāraba financing contract at sharia banking. Overall, 
customer satisfaction level which gained as the effect of collateral implementation in muḍāraba 
financing contract is 5.6, which means very satisfy both for sharia banking and customers. That is to 
say, both for sharia bank and customers have the equal satisfaction regarding to collateral 
implementation in muḍārabah financing contract. This is happened because through the implementation 
of collateral, those two parties can reach their purposes. For sharia banking institutions, the bank can 
provide such safety financing without any worries regarding to moral hazard or asymmetry information 
while gives muḍārabah financing contract. While for the customers, when they proposed such collateral 
to the bank based on the agreement they will get the financing which has been proposing in order to 
fulfill their needs. Besides, based on the result of questionnaire, the customers also satisfy regarding to 
such services which gave by sharia banking while explaining the function and position of collateral in 
muḍārabah financing contract. Further, customers also belief that sharia bank is able to keep and safe 
the goods which have proposed by them as the collateral. 
This condition is in line through the concept of customer satisfaction which revealed that such 
satisfaction can be reached when the reality can fulfill customer perception (Oliver, 2014). This 
condition also occurred for sharia banking. That is to say, sharia banking will reached such satisfaction 
when the customers are able to meet sharia bank goals regarding to financing activity. Furthermore, the 
same level of satisfaction between sharia bank and customer also indicates that there is an equality in 
muḍārabah financing contract activity regarding to collateral implementation. This is in accordance 
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with maqāshid al-syariah concept which commands every muamalah activity must be appropriate with 
sharia principle, and avoids any injustice (Auda, 2019; Syaputra et al., 2014). 
Table 5. Total Average Level of Satisfaction 
Descriptive Statistics N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Satisfaction 116 1.33 5.60 4.6768 
Valid N (listwise) 116       
Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics Output for Satisfaction Based onPractitioners’ Perception 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics Output for Satisfaction Based on Customers’ Perception 
Descriptive Statistics N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Satisfaction (customers) 67 1.33 5.60 4.5846 
Valid N (listwise) 67       
Then, this condition also strengthened by the result of correlation between collateral implementation 
and customer satisfaction variables (Table 15). The result revealed that the direct impact between 
collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract toward customer satisfaction reached 
significant relationship. That is to say, it is evidence that collateral is able to create such an equality for 
sharia banking and customers. 
Relationship between Collateral to Maslahah in Muḍāraba Financing Contract at Sharia Banking 
Based on the results of questionnaires to sharia banking customers and practitioners regarding to the 
rate of maslahah level as the impact of collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract, 
Table 8 shows the result of correlation between collateral variable and maslahah, which divided based 
on sharia banking practitioners and customers perceptions, as well as accumulation between them. 
Table 8. Model Summary (General Model I) 
Model Summary R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
General Model I 0.688a 0.473 0.469 6.398 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_X 
Refers to the result, it is clearly describes that the number of R square of path analysis Model I 
reached 0.473. That is to say, collateral only contributes approximately 47.3% to influence maslahah 
regarding to the implementation of it in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking. While, 52.7% 
is considered from another variable outside this research. 
Table 9. Coefficients General Model (Accumulation between Sharia Banking Practitioners and 
Customers) 
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
  
(Constant) 42.677 5.238   8.148 0.000 
Collateral 1.525 0.151 0.688 10.124 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_Y 
Table 9 shows that the number of coefficient constant is 42.677 which means if the value of collateral 
(X) is zero (0), it means that the realization of maslahah regarding to the implementation of collateral 
in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking is approximately 42.677. Further, the coefficient 
Descriptive Statistics N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Satisfaction (practitioners) 49 3.47 5.60 4.8029 
Valid N (listwise) 49       
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regression of collateral (X) is 0.688, which means that if the variable of collateral is experiencing such 
increasing for about 1% of it triggers the increasing number of maslahah approximately 0.688. 
 
Figure 2. General Model I 
What is more? The Table 9 gives that the significant value regarding to the relationship between 
collateral and maslahah, reaching 0.00 which is lower (<) than 0.05. That is to say, collateral in 
muḍārabah financing contract positively significant affect maslahah. 
Table 10. Coefficients (Model I.1) based on Practitioners’ Perception 
The Table 10 shows that the number of coefficient constant is 49.986 which means if the value of 
collateral (X) is zero (0), it means that the realization of maslahah regarding to the implementation of 
collateral in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking is approximately 49.986. Further, the 
coefficient regression of collateral (X) is 0.547, which means that if the variable of collateral is 
experiencing such increasing for about 1% of it triggers the increasing number of maslahah 
approximately 0.547. 
 
Figure 3. Model I.1 
What is more? The Table 10 gives that the significant value regarding to the relationship between 
collateral and maslahah, reaching 0.00 which is lower (<) than 0.05. That is to say, collateral in 
muḍārabah financing contract positively significant affect maslahah for sharia banking practitioners. 
Table 11. Coefficients (Model I.2) based on Customers’ Perception 
The Table 11 shows that the number of coefficient constant is 47.778 which means if the value of 
collateral (X) is zero (0), it means that the realization of maslahah regarding to the implementation of 
collateral in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking is approximately 47.778. Further, the 
coefficient regression of collateral (X) is 0.536, which means that if the variable of collateral is 
experiencing such increasing for about 1% of it triggers the increasing number of maslahah 
approximately 0.536.  
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 49.986 10.536  4.744 0.000 
Collateral 1.309 0.292 0.547 4.481 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Maslahah 
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) 47.778 9.396  5.085 0.000 
Collateral 1.412 0.276 0.536 5.119 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Maslahah 
 
Collateral (X) Maslahah (Y1) 0.688 
e = 0.725 
Collateral (X) Maslahah (Y1) 0.547 




Figure 4. Path Model I.2 
What is more? The Table 11 gives that the significant value regarding to the relationship between 
collateral and maslahah, reaching 0.00 which is lower (<) than 0.05. That is to say, collateral in 
muḍārabah financing contract positively significant affect maslahah for sharia banking customers. 
Therefore, it is evidence that collateral brings positive significant effect to maslahah based on sharia 
banking practitioners and customers perception. It can be seen that the result is appropriate with the 
expectation of researcher that the better of collateral management at sharia baking, the higher maslahah 
get which able to trigger customer satisfaction. Then, this result also accordance with the previous 
researches which revealed that collateral is able to bring maslahah (Hafidah, 2013; Harahap, 2008; 
Lestari, 2019). This conditions happened because the function and position of collateral in muḍārabah 
financing contract at sharia banking as the preventive tool, which able to maintain such welfare both 
sharia banking and customers in the term of financing contract. 
Relationship between Collateral to Satisfaction Through Maslahah as the Intervening Variable in 
Muḍāraba Financing Contract at Sharia Banking 
Based on the result of questionnaire, here the correlation between collateral to satisfaction through 
maslahah as the intrervening variable. 
Table 12. Model Summary (General Model II) 
Model Summary R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
General Model II 0.728a 0.531 0.522 5.825 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Maslahah, Collateral 
Table 13. Coefficients (General Model II) 
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
  
(Constant) 7.979 5.998   1.330 0.186 
Collateral 0.529 0.189 0.248 2.798 0.006 
Maslahah 0.514 0.085 0.535 6.022 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Customer Satisfaction 
 
 Figure 5. General Path Model II 
  
Collateral (X) Maslahah (Y1) 0.536 
 
e = 0.725 




e = 0.521 
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Table 14. Coefficients (Model II.1) based on Practitioners’ Perception 
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 34.871 12.807  2.723 0.009 
Collateral 0.522 1.205 0.063 0.433 0.667 
Maslahah 0.374 0.116 0.472 3.220 0.002 
a. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction 
Table 15. Coefficients (Model II.2) based on Customers’ Perception 
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 8.002 7.635  1.048 0.299 
Collateral 0.794 0.225 0.370 3.534 0.001 
Maslahah 0.356 0.085 0.437 4.172 0.000 
a. Dependent Variable: Satisfaction 
The relationship between maslahah and customer satisfaction based on the statistical result is 
positive and significant. That is to say, the existence of maslahah specifically in muḍārabah financing 
contract regarding to collateral implementation gives a positive and significant impact toward customer 
satisfaction. This condition happened due to the collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing 
contract surprisingly provides such maslahah both for sharia banking and customers. This is appropriate 
with previous research which revealed by Lestari (2019) that the existence of collateral in muḍārabah 
provides maslahah specifically hifdz al-māl.  
Then, when such muamalah activity has reached such maslahah, it is probably also achieved justice 
which triggers such satisfaction for them as the subject of the activity. This condition is accordance 
with the theory of maslahah and justice which revealed by Jaser Auda John Rawls respectively that 
maqāshid al-syariah (maslahah) as an indicator for measuring every muamalah activity, whether is 
appropriate through sharia principle or not. This is because when such muamalah activities are 
appropriate with maqāshid syariah, absolutely it has a justice distribution (Auda, 2019; Syaputra et al., 
2014), when there is a justice, mostly triggers such satisfaction into it (Dahlan, 2012; Rawls, 2014). 
Based on hypothesis test results, it is clearly described that the direct effects of each variable are 
positive significant. Collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking gives 
positive significant toward maslahah and customer satisfaction as general. This condition also happened 
when examining the relationship between maslahah to customer satisfaction.  
Therefore, it can be seen that the result is appropriate with the expectation of researcher that the 
better of collateral management at sharia banking, the higher maslahah get which able to trigger 
customer satisfaction. Then, this result also accordance with the previous researches which revealed 
that collateral is able to bring maslahah (Hafidah, 2013; Harahap, 2008; Lestari, 2019), and this is also 
appropriate with the statement which revealed that if maslahah has established it will trigger customer 
satisfaction (Zahrah, 1997; Dahlan, 2012; Rawls, 2014; Syaputra et al, 2014). 
Although as general these three variables revealed positive significant, there are some differences 
report when examining based on sharia banking practitioners’ and customers’ perception. The result of 
the former revealed that collateral gives positive insignificant effect toward customer satisfaction. This 
condition happened because when sharia banking have to liquidate the collateral, it takes time due to 
the tight such auction procedures of collateral liquidation through state auction board. Besides, it is also 
do not give such a significant profits for sharia banking. Meanwhile, the latter reported positive 
significant. 
Further, the indirect effect revealed positive significant as general. This is happened, because the 
number of indirect impact > direct impact regarding to examining the effect of collateral to customer 
satisfaction through maslahah as the intervening variable, which means the variable of maslahah in this 
research is able to mediate, and strengthen the relationship between collateral to customer satisfaction. 
This result also similar to the result of indirect effect between these three variables based on 
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practitioners’ perception. This condition happened because sharia banking has a big responsibility to 
secure such capital which had entrusted by the third party to sharia banking. 
Nevertheless, the result of indirect effect based on customers’ perception revealed conversely, which 
is positive insignificant.  This condition happened due to lack of knowledge regarding to maslahah 
itself as the impact of collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking. 
This is happened due to majority customers of sharia banking are willing to propose such collateral 
when they are proposed muḍārabah financing contract, but they do not want if the collateral is disbursed 
when they are failed to pay off their obligation. This is in line with with respondents’ answer description 
which revealed that the indicator of collateral as the risk mitigation tool gained the lower score 
compared to another indicator.  
Therefore, it is prominent for sharia banking to more educate every customers regarding to the 
function and position of collateral in every contract, specifically in muḍārabah financing contract, and 
emphasizing customers to more responsible in order to pay off their obligation. This is evidence that 
the existence of collateral in muḍārabah financing contract is truly gives maslahah, but cannot trigger 
such satisfaction both for sharia banking also the customers. 
This is contradicted with fatwa of National Sharia Board No.7 of 200 point 7 regarding to collateral 
requirement in muḍārabah financing contract. In the fatwa it is clearly mentioned that the function of 
collateral in muḍārabah financing contract is for holding the financial risk in order to create maslahah 
for both parties of the contract. 
Conclusion 
Overall, it is evidence that collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract is truly gives 
such masahah and satisfaction levels, even though there is a little difference of maslahah level both for 
sharia banking practitioners and customers. This result also strengthen by the result of direct impact 
between collateral to maslahah itself, which reported that collateral significantly brings positive effect 
to maslahah both for sharia banking practitioners also the customers. Then, the correlation between 
maslahah itself to customer satisfaction also bring positive significant impact for customers. 
Furthermore, the same condition also happened relating to satisfaction regarding to collateral 
implementation in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking. 
The indirect impact revealed positive significant as general. Although as general reported positive 
significant, there is a little differences result for sharia banking practitioners and customers. While the 
former revealed positive significant because the number of indirect effect is higher than the direct effect. 
However, the latter revealed conversely (positive insignificant).  This is happened, because the number 
of indirect impact is lower that the direct impact. This condition happened, because in a real activity 
regarding to collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing contract at sharia banking, customers 
are willing to propose the collateral when they are proposing muḍārabah financing contract as a 
guarantee tool for holding financial risk. However, when they are unable to pay off the obligation they 
do not want if the collateral is disbursing. That is to say, this research conclude that practically, 
customers are not satisfy enough regarding to collateral implementation in muḍārabah financing 
contract at sharia banking as the prudential tool. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Respondent Answer Description for Collateral Variable 
 
Table A2. Respondent’s Answer Description for Maslahah Variable 
  
C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T
1 X.1 26.86% 20.41% 24.13% 56.71% 65.31% 60.34% 10.44% 12.24% 11.20% 2.99% 2.04% 1.72% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 2.99% 0% 1.72% 5 5.04 5 Better Better Better
2 X.2 14.93% 30.61% 19.82% 68.66% 65.31% 59.48% 11.94% 4.08% 17.24% 4.48% 2.04% 2.59% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 4.94 5.2 4.93 Good Better Good
3 X.3 8.96% 32.65% 18.10% 65.67% 63.27% 62.07% 16.42% 4.08% 13.80% 4.48% 2.04% 3.44% 2.99% 0% 1.72% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 4.72 5.22 4.89 Good Better Good
4 X.4 5.97% 20.41% 12.07% 44.78% 53.06% 48.28% 14.93% 16.33% 15.51% 28.35 8.16% 18.97% 5.98% 4.08% 4.31% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 4.65 4.82 4.42 Good Good Good
5 X.5 28.35% 46.93% 36.20% 59.70% 46.93% 54.31% 8.96% 4.08% 6.90% 2.99% 2.04% 1.72% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 5.13 5.39 5.22 Better Better Better
6 X.6 49.23% 46.93% 4.28% 46.27% 44.90% 44.82% 2.99% 4.08% 3.44% 1.50% 4.08% 1.72% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 1.72% 5.43 5.35 5.34 Better Better Better
7 X.7 19.40% 18.37% 17.24% 61.20% 59.18% 60.34% 5.98% 18.37% 11.20% 5.98% 4.08% 4.31% 4.48% 0% 3.45% 4.48% 0% 3.45% 4.76 4.92 4.73 Good Good Good
4.95 5.13 4.93 Good Better Good




C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T C P T
1 Y1.1 16.41% 18.37% 17.24% 68.66% 69.38% 68.97% 11.94% 10.44% 3.44% 2.99% 2.99% 2.59% 0% 1.50% 0% 0% 2.99% 0% 4.98 5.06 5.01 Good Best Best
2 Y1.2 20.90% 44.80% 31.90% 65.67% 42.86% 53.44% 10.45% 6.12% 11.20% 2.99% 6.12% 3.45% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5.04 5.27 5.14 Best Best Best
3 Y1.3 35.82% 59.12% 45.69% 47.76% 34.70% 41.37% 14.93% 6.12% 12.06% 2.99% 0% 0.87% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5.18 5.53 5.32 Best Best Best
4 Y1.4 19.40% 14.28% 14.66% 64.18% 73.40% 73.28% 13.43% 10.20% 10.34% 4.48% 2.99% 1.72% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5.03 5 5.43 Best Best Best
5 Y1.5 32.84% 36.73% 27.59% 47.76% 48.98% 54.31% 14.93% 14.29% 14.66% 5.98% 0% 3.44% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5.06 5.22 5.06 Best Best Best
6 Y1.6 29.85% 24.49% 26.72% 50.75% 57.14% 53.45% 13.43% 18.37% 17.24% 4.48% 0% 0.86% 1.50% 0% 1.72% 0% 0% 0% 5.03 5.06 5.03 Best Best Best
7 Y1.7 17.91% 16.33% 16.38% 64.18% 63.27% 61.20% 16.42% 16.22% 18.10% 1.50% 2.99% 3.44% 0% 2.99% 1.72% 0% 0% 0% 4.99 4.9 4.88 Good Good Good
8 Y1.8 25.37% 28.58% 24.14% 53.73% 65.31% 26.07% 16.42% 6.12% 12.07% 4.48% 0% 1.72% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5 5.22 5.87 Best Best Best
9 Y1.9 17.91% 30.61% 24.14% 56.72% 48.98% 55.17% 13.43% 16.33 15.52% 7.47% 4.08% 5.17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4.94 5.06 4.98 Good Good Good
10 Y1.10 17.91% 24.49% 19.83% 62.69% 44.90% 51.72% 16.42% 24.49% 20.69% 1.50% 6.12% 5.17% 0% 0% 0.86% 1.50% 0% 1.72% 4.91 4.88 4.79 Good Good Good
11 Y1.11 20.90% 26.53% 23.28% 58.21% 59.18% 60.34% 19.40% 14.29% 15.52% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.86% 1.50% 0% 0% 4.96 5.12 5.05 Good Best Best
12 Y1.12 23.88% 20.41% 19.83% 58.21% 79.60% 69.83% 14.93% 0% 9.48% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 5.03 5.2 5.07 Best Best Best
13 Y1.13 17.91% 38.78% 25% 59.70% 53.10% 56.03% 20.90% 8.16% 18.10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 4.91 5.31 5.03 Good Best Best
14 Y1.14 26.87% 42.86% 33.62% 56.72% 46.94% 54.31% 13.43% 10.20% 11.20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 5.09 5.33 5.19 Best Best Best
15 Y1.15 13.43% 14.29% 14.66% 71.65% 59.18% 62.93% 13.43% 18.36% 16.38% 0% 6.12% 3.45% 1.50% 2.99% 2.59% 0% 0% 0% 4.96 4.78 4.83 Good Good Good
16 Y1.I6 7.46% 20.41% 13.79% 64.18% 42.86% 53.45% 17.91% 28.57% 22.41% 4.48% 6.12% 0.63% 4.48% 0% 0.86% 1.50% 0% 2.59% 4.61 4.71 4.9 Good Good Good
17 Y1.17 28.36% 30.61% 30.17% 53.73% 55.10% 54.31% 13.43% 12.24% 12.07% 2.99% 2.99% 2.59% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 5.03 5.14 5.09 Best Best Good
18 Y1.18 32.84% 30.61% 31.03% 28.81% 55.10% 49.13% 22.39% 12.24% 17.24% 1.50% 2.99% 0.86% 2.99% 0% 0.86% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 4.93 5.14 5.06 Good Best Best
19 Y1.19 31.34% 26.53% 26.72% 49.25% 59.18% 56.90% 17.91% 12.24% 15.52% 0% 2.99% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1.50% 0% 0.86% 5.07 5.1 5.08 Best Best Best
4.99 5.11 5.1 Good Best BestTOTAL AVERAGE
D VD Average Score Description
No. Indicators
VA A AE SD
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Table A3. Validity Test Output 
 
Table A4. Reliability Statistics 
Table A5. Normality Test 
 



















X.1 200.13 339.801 .546 .943
X.2 200.19 339.964 .578 .943
X.3 200.24 342.341 .445 .944
X.4 200.71 342.922 .318 .945
X.5 199.91 340.139 .583 .943
X.6 199.78 340.240 .510 .943
X.7 200.40 341.024 .362 .945
Y1.1 200.12 344.785 .521 .943
Y1.2 199.99 348.965 .279 .945
Y1.3 199.81 346.312 .391 .944
Y1.4 200.12 349.829 .336 .944
Y1.5 200.07 340.726 .578 .943
Y1.6 200.10 339.537 .583 .943
Y1.7 200.24 345.785 .396 .944
Y1.8 200.04 341.850 .621 .943
Y1.9 200.15 343.361 .460 .943
Y1.10 200.34 337.477 .532 .943
Y1.11 200.08 342.090 .582 .943
Y1.12 200.06 339.327 .725 .942
Y1.13 200.09 338.452 .656 .942
Y1.14 199.94 338.509 .664 .942
Y1.15 200.29 343.009 .452 .944
Y1.16 200.49 338.026 .483 .944
Y1.17 200.03 340.034 .553 .943
Y1.18 200.07 336.465 .638 .942












a. Test distribution is Normal.
b. Calculated from data.









Sum of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
(Combined) 39.699 16 2.481 2.952 .001
Linearity 24.675 1 24.675 29.358 .000
Deviation from 
Linearity










Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
0.914 26 
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Table A7. Multicollinearity Test  
  




B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 7.979 5.998 1.330 .186
Collateral (X) .529 .189 .248 2.798 .006 .527 1.899
Maslahah (Y1) .514 .085 .535 6.022 .000 .527 1.899
1









B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 7.979 5.998 1.330 .186
Collateral .529 .189 .248 2.798 .006
Maslahah .514 .085 .535 6.022 .000
1
a. Dependent Variable: Customer Satisfaction
Coefficients
a
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
